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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 This case concerns the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
failure to follow precedent set forth by this Court.1 
 
 Alejandro Misael Melendez Saravia (“Saravia”) 
petitions for review of the Board’s decision affirming the 
Immigration Judge’s denial of his application for withholding 
of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) and relief under the 
Convention Against Torture.2  Before the Immigration Judge, 
Saravia argued that he had a well-founded fear of persecution 
on the basis of his membership in a particular social group.  
The Immigration Judge found Saravia to be credible, but 
determined that Saravia failed to corroborate his claim.  The 
Board affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, and this 
petition followed. 
 
 In Chukwu v. Attorney General,3 we held that an 
Immigration Judge must “give the applicant notice of what 
corroboration will be expected and an opportunity to present 
an explanation if the applicant cannot produce such 
corroboration.”4  Despite the Board’s subsequent contrary 
                                              
1 See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 553 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“The [Board] is required to follow court of appeals precedent 
within the geographical confines of the relevant circuit.” 
(citation omitted)). 
2 See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18 (implementing the Convention 
Against Torture).  
3 484 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2007). 
4 Id. at 192. 
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decision,5 we remind Immigration Judges in our Circuit that 





Saravia is a native and citizen of El Salvador.  In about 
1996, when Saravia was five, his mother left for the United 
States for economic reasons.  After this, he lived with his 
father.   
 
A. Saravia’s Encounters with MS-13 
 
In 2005, members of MS-13 began trying to recruit 
Saravia into the gang.  He refused, and they beat and threatened 
him.  Before the Immigration Judge, Saravia testified that they 
kicked him and hit him with fists, but that the injuries were not 
severe enough for him to go to the hospital.  Saravia testified 
that the gang members threatened Saravia with the murder of 
his family if he told his father and his father reported the gang 
to the police.  Saravia also testified that after the gang 
discovered that his mother lived in the United States, they 
demanded money from him.  The gang issued Saravia an 
ultimatum: either join the gang or pay $15,000.  He testified 
that gang members continued threatening him, leading his 
father to send Saravia and Saravia’s younger sister to live with 
their mother in Paterson, New Jersey.  He entered the United 
States without inspection sometime in 2006. 
 
                                              
5 Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 516, 523–24 (B.I.A. 2015) 
(“Applicants have the burden to establish their claim without 
prompting from the Immigration Judge.”). 
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Saravia testified that in March of 2011, his cousin, Juan 
Ramon Hernandez Melendez, was killed in El Salvador by 
members of MS-13.  He testified that Juan was a police officer 
and that MS-13 had asked Juan for firearms and killed him 
when he refused.  Saravia also testified that eight months after 
his cousin was killed, members of MS-13 in El Salvador 
kidnapped another of his cousins, Francisco Hernandez, and 
brutally tortured him for information about Saravia and 
Saravia’s father. Hernandez was released in December 2011, 
but then murdered by MS-13 gang members two days later, 
according to Saravia. 
 
Saravia also testified that he fears returning to El 
Salvador because a property inherited by his mother has been 
occupied and seized by MS-13 after his mother, via a cousin of 
Saravia’s in El Salvador, began renting the property to a 
woman apparently affiliated with MS-13.  Saravia testified that 
MS-13 uses the house for meetings and to torture people, and 
that he fears that if he returns to El Salvador, the government 
will assume he is linked to the gang. 
 
In August 2015, MS-13 gang members attacked 
Saravia’s father.  He was hospitalized for five days.  During his 
recovery, MS-13 gang members called Saravia’s half-brother 
and threatened to kill Saravia’s father and his family if he 
reported the beating to police.  According to Saravia, they 
added that they would kill Saravia if they found him in El 
Salvador.  Saravia’s half-brother then fled to the United States. 
 
B. Saravia’s Arrest and the Telephone Threats 
 
In April 2015, Saravia was arrested in New Jersey and 
charged with aggravated assault, simple assault on a law 
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enforcement officer, resisting arrest by physical force or 
violence, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, unlawful 
possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of a weapon.  
These charges, according to Saravia, arose from a domestic 
misunderstanding and police officers’ decision to hit and 
handcuff him.  
 
Saravia testified that, while he was in police custody, 
MS-13 gang members called his mother and threatened to kill 
him if he returned to El Salvador.  They stated that they knew 
he was in police custody and that he was going to be deported 
back to El Salvador.  In May 2015, Saravia entered into a pre-
trial intervention program.  The charges against him were to be 
dismissed after a one-year term of probation.  However, during 
his probation, Saravia was arrested for driving under the 
influence. 
 
C. Removal Proceedings Against Saravia 
 
The Department of Homeland Security commenced 
removal proceedings against Saravia by filing a Notice to 
Appear with the Immigration Court in Elizabeth, New Jersey.  
In March 2016, Saravia conceded inadmissibility as charged 
and all factual allegations in the Notice to Appear.  Thereafter, 
Saravia submitted Form I-859, applying for asylum and 
withholding of removal.   
 
Saravia testified before the Immigration Judge on 
November 15, 2016.  In the course of Saravia’s testimony, the 





JUDGE TO MR. MELENDEZ-
SARAVIA 
According to your earlier 
testimony, you stated that a gang 
member phoned your mother here 
in the United States while you 
were incarcerated by the State of 
New Jersey. 
MR. MELENDEZ-SARAVIA TO 
JUDGE 
Yes, I was – when I was detained 
in 2015. 
JUDGE TO MR. MELENDEZ-
SARAVIA 
Okay.  Now – and your mother 
lives here in the State of New 
Jersey now, is that right? 
MR. MELENDEZ-SARAVIA TO 
JUDGE 
Yes, she lives in Patterson [sic]. 
. . .  




Why hasn’t she come here to 
testify about this threat, this recent 
threat against you? 
MR. MELENDEZ-SARAVIA TO 
JUDGE 
Yes, my mom is in the waiting 
area.  They never told us that they 
needed her to do that type of 
declaration. 
JUDGE TO MS. AL-QALDA 
[Melendez Saravia’s counsel] 
Counsel, do we have a statement 
from the mother attesting to that 
element of the claim?  I’m not 
aware of one in the record. 
MS. AL-QALDA TO JUDGE 
I’m not aware of one in the record, 
Your Honor, as well. 
JUDGE TO MS. AL-QALDA 
All right. 
JUDGE TO MR. MELENDEZ-
SARAVIA 
You also have a half-brother in the 
United States, right, who recently 
came to the United States? 
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MR. MELENDEZ-SARAVIA TO 
JUDGE 
Yes.  Right. 
JUDGE TO MR. MELENDEZ-
SARAVIA 
Does he also reside now in the 
State of New Jersey? 
MR. MELENDEZ-SARAVIA TO 
JUDGE 
No, he lives in Boston, 
Massachusetts. 
JUDGE TO MR. MELENDEZ-
SARAVIA 
Now, according to your testimony 
he’s also aware – he also witnessed 
recent threats against you from 
gang members in El Salvador, 
right? 
MR. MELENDEZ-SARAVIA TO 
JUDGE 
Yes. 
JUDGE TO MS. AL-QALDA 
Counsel, do we have a statement 
from this percipient witness? 
10 
 
MS. AL-QALDA TO JUDGE 
We don’t. 
JUDGE TO MS. AL-QALDA 
All right.  Is there any reason 
why no corroboration was 
offered from these two fact 
witnesses? 
MS. AL-QALDA TO JUDGE 
Your Honor, there isn’t.  We have 
absolutely no excuse for that, but 
simply the time constraints to 
make sure that we were ready for 
the individual and we were 
collecting as much of the other 
documents and having most of the 
other documents and corroborating 
evidence translated as well.6 
 After asking whether there were any further questions 
or witnesses—in context, witnesses immediately available for 
that proceeding—the Immigration Judge adjourned the 
proceeding.  The record does not indicate any additional 
proceedings prior to the Immigration Judge’s decision.  
 
In a written decision issued on December 15, 2016, the 
Immigration Judge denied Saravia’s application.  He found 
                                              
6 A346–47 (emphasis added). 
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Saravia to be a credible witness.7  However, he found that 
Saravia “failed to corroborate [] critical aspects of his claim, 
including the alleged threats against him personally.”8  The 
Immigration Judge acknowledged this Circuit’s three-part 
requirement when finding lack of corroboration, but ruled that, 
because of the Board’s 2015 opinion in Matter of L-A-C-,9 he 
was not required to give Saravia “advance notice of the specific 
corroborating evidence necessary to meet [his] burden of 
proof.”10 
 
The Immigration Judge found that Saravia was 
ineligible for asylum because he applied more than one year 
after entering the United States. 
 
Specifically, the Immigration Judge found that Saravia 
had not met his burden for withholding of removal because he 
failed to establish a “particular social group” in the purported 
group of which he was a member: “young men looked at to be 
recruited by then MS-13 gang in El Salvador.”11 
   
Applying Matter of M-E-V-G-,12 the Immigration Judge 
concluded that Saravia’s proposed social group was neither 
                                              
7 A13 (“After careful consideration of the totality of the 
circumstances and all relevant factors, the Court finds 
Respondent credible.”).  
8 A14. 
9 26 I. & N. Dec. 516 (B.I.A. 2015). 
10 Id. at 524. 
11 A16.  On appeal, Saravia’s counsel defines the group as 
“young male Salvadorans who were recruited by gangs and 
refused to join.”  Petitioner’s Br. at 12. 
12 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014). 
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sufficiently “socially distinct” nor sufficiently particular.  He 
further denied Convention Against Torture relief because 
Saravia did not establish the probability that he would be 
tortured if returned to El Salvador, and because he had not 
established government participation, consent, or acquiescence 
to any torture that would occur. 
 
 The Board, ignoring supplemental evidence provided 
by Saravia on appeal (as required by law), affirmed.13  In one 
paragraph, it confused Saravia’s nation of origin, repeatedly 
referring to his experiences in Honduras.  It held that the 
Immigration Judge properly applied M-E-V-G-. This petition 
for review followed. 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
We have jurisdiction to review a final order of the Board 
dismissing an appeal of an Immigration Judge’s denial of an 
alien’s application for withholding of removal and relief under 
the Convention Against Torture under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  
We may only consider the reasons provided by the Board,14 but 
                                              
13 See Matter of Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57, 73–74 & n.10 
(B.I.A. 1984) (“[A]ll evidence which is pertinent to 
determinations made during deportation proceedings, such as 
the determination of the respondent's eligibility for suspension 
of deportation, must be adduced in the hearing before the 
immigration judge.”). 
14 See Orabi v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 539 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (“Because the [Board] did not reach its decision 
based on this ground, we may not affirm the judgment on this 
ground.”) (citing Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 
U.S. 194, 196 (1947)). 
13 
 
where the Board “both adopts the findings of the [Immigration 
Judge] and discusses some of the bases for the [Immigration 
Judge’s] decision, we have authority to review the decisions of 
both the [Immigration Judge] and the [Board].”15  We defer to 
the administrative findings of fact, which “are conclusive 
unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 





Presented with a credible witness, the Immigration 
Judge found that Saravia failed to sufficiently corroborate his 
story.  Contrary to our established precedent, the Immigration 
Judge here failed to provide Saravia with notice and an 
opportunity to provide that corroboration.  In doing so, the 
Immigration Judge relied on a decision of the Board that is 
contrary to the law of this Circuit.  Because Immigration 
Judges in this Circuit must follow the law of this Circuit, we 
will vacate and remand for further proceedings. 
 
A. The Burden of Asylum and Related Relief 
 
“The burden of establishing eligibility for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and relief under [the Convention 
Against Torture] is on the applicant.”18  Saravia does not 
                                              
15 Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 
Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
16 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 
17 Orabi, 738 F.3d at 539.  
18 Toure v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 443 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a)). 
14 
 
petition this Court for review of the denial of his asylum 
application.  His asylum claim was denied as time-barred, as 
he did not apply for asylum within one year of entering the 
United States.  Before us, he petitions for review of the denial 
of his application for withholding of removal and the denial of 
his application for relief under the Convention Against Torture. 
 
Withholding of removal is relief from removal distinct 
from asylum, although they are related.19  To be eligible for 
withholding of removal, the applicant must “establish that his 
or her life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed 
country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”20  “The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may 
be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without 
corroboration.”21  “Withholding of removal does not rely on 
the perspective of the applicant’s well founded fear, but is 
instead appropriate only if the Attorney General determines 
that there is a ‘clear probability’ that the alien’s life or freedom 
would be threatened upon her removal to a particular 
country.”22 
                                              
19 See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (“An asylum application shall 
be deemed to constitute at the same time an application for 
withholding of removal . . . .”); Chukwu v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 
484 F.3d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Withholding of removal is 
a remedy distinct from asylum and confers only the right not 
to be deported to a particular country, rather than the right to 
stay in this one.”). 
20 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). 
21 Id. 
22 Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 412 (1984)). 
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To obtain relief under the Convention Against Torture, 
the applicant must show “that it is more likely than not that he 
would be tortured upon return to his country.”23 
 
The role of corroboration in sustaining an applicant’s 
burden is identical in asylum, withholding of removal, and 
relief under the Convention Against Torture.  That role is 
defined by two relevant statutory provisions.  First, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), as amended by the REAL ID Act of 
2005,24 provides, with respect to asylum: 
 
The testimony of the applicant 
may be sufficient to sustain the 
applicant's burden without 
corroboration, but only if the 
applicant satisfies the trier of fact 
that the applicant's testimony is 
credible, is persuasive, and refers 
to specific facts sufficient to 
demonstrate that the applicant is a 
refugee. In determining whether 
the applicant has met the 
applicant's burden, the trier of fact 
may weigh the credible testimony 
along with other evidence of 
record. Where the trier of fact 
determines that the applicant 
should provide evidence that 
corroborates otherwise credible 
                                              
23 Chukwu, 484 F.3d at 189 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)). 




testimony, such evidence must be 
provided unless the applicant does 
not have the evidence and cannot 
reasonably obtain the evidence.25 
This same provision applies to withholding of removal 
and relief under the Convention Against Torture.  8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3)(C) provides that, for the purposes of withholding of 
removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture, 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) and 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) 
describe the manner in which “the trier of fact shall determine 
whether the alien has sustained the alien’s burden of proof.”26  
 
Second, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4), as amended by the 
REAL ID Act, prohibits a court from “revers[ing] a 
determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the 
availability of corroborating evidence . . . unless the court 
finds, pursuant to subsection (b)(4)(B), that a reasonable trier 
of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating 
evidence is unavailable.” 27 
 
B. The Abdulai Inquiry 
 
Prior to the passage of the REAL ID Act, we concluded 
in Abdulai v. Ashcroft that the Board’s rule requiring applicant 
corroboration in certain cases was valid in principle, albeit 
invalidly applied.28  Our formulation of the rule, which has 
come to be known as the “Abdulai inquiry” or “Abdulai 
                                              
25 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). 
26 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C). 
27 Toure, 443 F.3d at 325. 
28 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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analysis,”29 imposes the following obligations on the 
Immigration Judge when determining that a failure to 
corroborate undermines the applicant’s claim: 
 
(1) an identification of the facts for 
which “it is reasonable to expect 
corroboration;” (2) an inquiry as to 
whether the applicant has provided 
information corroborating the 
relevant facts; and, if he or she has 
not, (3) an analysis of whether the 
applicant has adequately explained 
his or her failure to do so.30 
Abdulai, however, predates the passage of the REAL ID 
Act of 2005, which, among other things, modified the language 
of § 1158(b)(1) and § 1252(b)(4).  Prior to its amendment by 
the REAL ID Act, § 1158(b)(1) did not specify the burden of 
proof to be carried by the applicant, as now codified in 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).31  Further, the REAL ID Act amended 
§ 1252(b)(4) to prohibit a court from “revers[ing] a 
determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the 
availability of corroborating evidence,” with the exception 
noted above.32  Despite the statutory changes, we held in Toure 
v. Attorney General of the United States, that the REAL ID Act 
                                              
29 Chukwu, 484 F.3d at 193 (“The [Immigration Judge] thus 
failed to satisfy the Abdulai analysis before penalizing Chukwu 
for failing to corroborate his date of membership.”). 
30 Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 554. 
31 Toure, 443 F.3d at 325; REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-13, Div. B, Title I, sec. 101(a). 
32 Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, Title I, sec. 101(e). 
18 
 
and § 1252(b)(4) specifically do not “alter our rules that (1) an 
[Immigration Judge] has a duty to develop an applicant’s 
testimony . . . and (2) as a logical predicate to appellate review, 
the [Board] must adequately explain the reasons for its 
decisions.”33  In other words, as we stated in Chukwu v. 
Attorney General of the United States, “we cannot ascertain 
whether the trier of fact would be compelled to find the 
evidence unavailable unless the applicant is given a chance to 
explain why he thinks it is unavailable.”34 
 
Thus, we recognized, in both Chukwu and Toure, that 
satisfying Abdulai requires Immigration Judges to “give the 
applicant notice of what corroboration will be expected and an 
opportunity to present an explanation if the applicant cannot 
produce such corroboration” under § 1252(b)(4).35  Neither 
Chukwu nor Toure, however, considered the amended 
                                              
33 443 F.3d at 325.  We note that the Immigration Judge’s 
obligation to develop the record takes on particular importance 
where a respondent in removal proceedings is not provided 
counsel.  A respondent has only “the privilege of being 
represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of 
the alien's choosing who is authorized to practice in such 
proceedings.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A).  See Ponce-Levia v. 
Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 374 (3d Cir. 2003) (“It is well-
established that an alien at an immigration hearing has some 
form of right to counsel.  It is equally well-settled, though, that 
‘there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in deportation 
hearings.’”) (quoting Uspango v. Ashcroft, 289 F.3d 226, 231 
(3d Cir. 2002)). 
34 484 F.3d at 192 (describing reasoning of Toure).  
35 Id. (citing Toure, 443 F.3d at 324). 
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provisions of § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), 36 and in Matter of L-A-C-, 
the Board held that this provision requires neither notice nor an 
opportunity to corroborate or explain the failure to 
corroborate.37  We now consider whether the Immigration 
Judge’s failure to provide Saravia notice and opportunity to 
corroborate is justified under Matter of L-A-C- and 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 
C. The Immigration Judge’s Failure to Provide 
Notice and Opportunity to Corroborate 
The Immigration Judge’s written decision reflects his 
reliance on Matter of L-A-C-, the Board’s decision holding that 
notice and opportunity to corroborate or explain the failure to 
corroborate are not required under § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).  Under 
Matter of L-A-C- and its interpretation of § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), 
the decision of the Immigration Judge understood Abdulai to 
require only an evaluation of “Respondent’s reasons for not 
submitting” corroborating evidence.38  It held that Saravia’s 
reasons were “inadequate.”39   
 
That interpretation of § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), however, is 
not reasonable.40  As noted, the last sentence in 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) states that “[w]here the trier of fact 
                                              
36 Chukwu, 484 F.3d at 191 n.2; Toure, 443 F.3d at 326 n.9. 
37 Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 523–24 (“Applicants 
have the burden to establish their claim without prompting 
from the Immigration Judge.”). 
38 A14. 
39 Id. 




determines that the applicant should provide evidence that 
corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must 
be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence 
and cannot reasonably obtain [it].”  Whether we construe under 
§ 1252(b)(4)(D) or § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), we cannot conclude on 
review that it was fair to require Saravia to provide further 
corroboration without telling him so and giving him the 
opportunity either to supply that evidence or to explain why it 
was not available.  Under any other rule, our review is not 
meaningful.41 
   
That opportunity to supply evidence or explain why it is 
not available can only occur before the Immigration Judge 
rules on the applicant’s petition.  To decide otherwise is 
illogical temporally and would allow for “gotcha” conclusions 
in Immigration Judge opinions.  “Justice requires that an 
applicant for asylum be given a meaningful opportunity to 
establish his or her claim.”42  Therefore, under the law in this 
Circuit, the Immigration Judge was obligated to provide 
Saravia with notice and an opportunity to corroborate his 
claim. 
 
We realize a circuit split exists on the purported 
ambiguity of the last sentence of § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).  
Compare, e.g., Gaye v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 519, 528-30 (6th Cir. 
2015) (there is no notice requirement in corroboration cases); 
Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2009) (“the alien 
bears the ultimate burden of introducing [corroborating] 
                                              
41 See Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 555; Chukwu, 484 F.3d at 192 
(citing Toure, 443 F.3d at 325). 
42 Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123, 136 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Senathirajah, 157 F.3d at 221). 
21 
 
evidence without prompting from the IJ”); and Rapheal v. 
Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 530 (7th Cir. 2008) (same), with Ren 
v. Holder 648 F.3d 1079, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 
statute [§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)] is clear.  An applicant must be 
given notice of the corroboration required, and an opportunity 
to either provide that corroboration or explain why he cannot 
do so.”); accord Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 
2014).  
 
While our result aligns with Ren, our rule derives 
principally from the fact that we cannot have meaningful 
judicial review without giving the applicant notice and an 
opportunity to corroborate.  See Chukwu, 484 F.3d at 192; 
Toure, 443 F.3d at 325; see generally Reed at 562-66.  The 
record here reflects that the Immigration Judge did not give 
Saravia notice or an opportunity to provide corroborating 
evidence or explain its unavailability.  At most, Saravia was 
given the opportunity to explain, through counsel, why he had 
not submitted corroborating evidence from his mother and 
half-brother.43  The Immigration Judge asked “[i]s there any 
reason why no corroboration was offered from [Saravia’s 
mother and half-brother]?”44   
 
The Immigration Judge’s question does not bear on the 
requirements of Chukwu, Toure, and Abdulai.  Whether 
Saravia did not corroborate his testimony is a question entirely 
different from whether he could not corroborate his testimony.  
                                              
43 There appears to have been no previous discussion, let alone 
notice, of Saravia’s failure to corroborate his claim of gang 
violence in El Salvador.  The Immigration Judge marked a 




We have clarified, in Chukwu and Toure, that Abdulai is not 
simply an inquiry into why an applicant submitted certain 
things into evidence and not others, but whether evidence 
corroborating an applicant’s testimony is available.  For an 
applicant to provide an explanation “if he cannot produce” 
corroboration,45 he must be provided an opportunity to produce 
it.  The decision of the Board is inconsistent with the law of 
this Circuit.46  
 
In fact, as the Immigration Judge noted when asking 
why Saravia’s mother had not testified, Saravia’s mother was 
outside in the waiting area during the proceedings.  Saravia 
stated that “[t]hey never told us that they needed her to do that 
type of declaration.”47  Saravia’s half-brother was in Boston at 
the time Saravia testified before the Immigration Judge.  In this 
case, it appears that Saravia, through counsel, did assert that 
corroboration was available but had not been submitted due to 
constraints of time and resources.  Saravia appears to have 
attempted to submit some corroborating evidence on appeal 
before the Board.  Although that is an improper venue to 
submit new evidence,48 it was also improper for the 
Immigration Judge to deny Saravia notice and an opportunity 
to produce the corroboration of his claims or an opportunity to 
explain his failure if he could not do so. 
                                              
45 Chukwu, 484 F.3d at 192 (citing Toure, 443 F.3d at 324). 
46 See Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 553 (“The [Board] is required to 
follow court of appeals precedent within the geographical 
confines of the relevant circuit.” (citation omitted)). 
47 A346. 




We do not reach the merits of Saravia’s application, nor 
do we opine on the potential effect of intervening law on those 
merits.49  Because “it is impossible for us to determine whether 
‘a reasonable trier of fact [would be] compelled to conclude 
such corroborating evidence is unavailable’ unless a petitioner 
is given the opportunity to testify as to its availability,”50 we 
will vacate and remand for a new corroboration 
determination.51 
 
For the foregoing reasons, Saravia’s petition is granted 
and the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals is vacated.  
This case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
                                              
49 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320 (A.G. 2018) 
(“Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence 
or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will 
not qualify for asylum.”); S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 894 
F.3d 535, 549–55 (3d Cir. 2018) (granting Chevron deference 
to the Board’s revised “particularity” and “social distinction” 
analysis of particular social group). 
50 Toure, 443 F.3d at 325 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D)). 
51 See id. (remanding for new corroboration determination). 
